It Is Time For Intermarium 2.0 Against Russia

Introduction

Donald Trump, JD Vance, and Pete Hegseth have been systematically dismantling the established Global Order in recent days, challenging the paradigm upon which an entire generation of European politicians had constructed their worldview. Despite numerous indications of impending change, their carefully cultivated geopolitical framework has rapidly disintegrated.

Is Ukraine’s fate already sealed? While it remains premature to draw definitive conclusions, it is unequivocal that increasingly sinister storm clouds are gathering over Kyiv and, by extension, Europe. Meanwhile, Brussels is convening urgent consultations, desperately seeking an antidote to an illness that has been manifestly evident for years.

In this turbulent context, it is imperative to strip away political illusions and confront reality with unflinching clarity. Should Russia be treated with unwarranted leniency, it is certain that the next phase of its imperialistic campaign is merely a matter of time, particularly if it perceives weakness or an opportunity to test NATO’s security guarantees.

Which sovereign state will become the next target? Geography demonstrates a brutal calculus—the nearby states, especially the smaller and most vulnerable ones like the Baltic republics, stand at heightened risk. Therefore, in this pivotal moment of fundamental geopolitical transformation, all those most threatened by Russian imperialism and motivated to arrest its expansion must forge an ironclad alliance: Intermarium 2.0, the Baltic-Carpathian Alliance, the Northern League. Choose your nomenclature, but the objective remains singular: to definitively halt Russian expansionism.

Current Geopolitical Situation

Before delving into the analysis of the proposed format, let us commence by examining the current situation. Recognizing that observing the entire geopolitical landscape can easily lead one into an endless labyrinth of nuances, we shall focus on the most critical variables that fundamentally determine the broader context.

Ukraine

The nation is suffering across virtually every domain of state functionality. Kyiv struggles to extend Russia’s onslaught with quantitative and equipment-based disadvantages resulting from Western supply weaknesses, forcing Ukrainian forces to retreat, particularly toward the Pokrovsk direction.

Conversely, Ukrainians have impressively developed their domestic defense industry, and their military remains the most robust and numerous on the continent, excluding the Russian Force. Kyiv remains critically dependent on American and/or European assistance.

Russia

For over a year, coinciding with the significant deceleration of American support for Ukraine, the Kremlin has been ascending, gradually advancing though without dramatic breakthroughs. The country’s economy operates in a wartime mode, with an apathetic society accepting the costs associated with the Ukrainian invasion.

Simultaneously, contrary to Kremlin propaganda, devastating equipment losses (more significantly) and human casualties (to a lesser extent) suggest that Russia cannot perpetuate this conflict indefinitely with appropriate Ukrainian support. Estimates indicate Moscow may have resources for an additional 1 to 1.5 years of conflict.

United States

America is undergoing a comprehensive redefinition, both internally and externally. Numerous labels might be applied to this policy, but whether termed isolationism, de-globalization, or offshore balancing, the outcome remains consistent: the Trump Administration seeks to divest itself of the Ukrainian problem with utmost expediency.

Hitherto, the question has been the extent of this divestment—whether through the initially proposed approach of compelling the aggressor (Russia) toward a settlement from a position of strength, or utilizing a spectrum of capabilities to alter their stance if they refuse, or through a more rapid disengagement. Currently, it appears that despite initial pronouncements, Washington is pursuing the latter strategy, blurring the fundamental narrative of aggressor and victim by engaging with Putin from a position of “Mandate of Heaven” granted by the American military-industrial complex.

China

Beijing observes the entire confrontation from the periphery. The Chinese will adeptly navigate both a fragile peace and conflict continuation; both scenarios appear advantageous from their strategic perspective.

Europe

Amidst its disarray and internal chaos, Europe must suddenly mature to confront a problem it has systematically avoided for over a decade, if not since the Georgian invasion of 2008. Herein lies a critical moment: Europe, anticipating for 18 months the diminishing American engagement, could have done everything to assume leadership from the Americans and stand behind Ukraine, leveraging its existing economic-industrial might. However, Europeans chose to passively observe American movements as if they were the sole possessors of tangible capabilities.

Three years—this was the duration Europe had to accelerate its military-industrial complex and confront Russia, especially given that it would not need to engage directly on the continent’s Eastern Frontier. A brave nation practically begged merely to receive sufficient assistance; they received almost none.

The $145 billion in aid to Ukraine which the union boasts about is pathetic. The cumulative GDP of European Union states in 2024 was approximately $18 trillion. Therefore, three years of GDP amounts to roughly $54 trillion. Consequently, the union has invested a mere 0.3% of its gross domestic product in supporting Ukraine over 3 years. Embarrassing.

Today, European politicians, in light of the paradigm shift by the new American Administration, oscillate in a chaotic dance, with some barely restraining their tears.

We arrive at the core question: Why did Europe lose Ukraine? Why did it not prepare over the years? Why is Europe so fundamentally ineffective at identifying high-stakes problems and responding appropriately? The problem and its answer lie deeply embedded.

Those following our analysis may recall the thesis presented in the episode “Europe in a Darwinian Evolutionary Process.” Contrary to Emmanuel Macron’s famous words, it is not NATO experiencing brain death, but the Union, with the Ukrainian War serving as its quintessential exemplar.

Ideally, the Union should have been invested in the most expeditious termination of the war, as it represents a significant economic, political, reputational, and social burden. Simultaneously, the collective’s interest was never—and is not—the acceptance of possibly altering state borders and governmental structures. In other words, supporting Ukraine was in the Union’s finest interest, particularly given Ukraine’s resistance and remarkable internal mobilization—a feat, interestingly, that likely no European nation could have achieved in 2022 had Russia attacked.

Certainly, a direct confrontation with Russia through Ukraine would have incurred costs, but with strategic management, this would have been negligible for 99% of its citizens. Presumably, the Union merely needed to collectively allocate 1% of its GDP annually for Ukraine. Then today’s counter would not reach $145 billion but $540 billion—over twice the current collective assistance from the Union and America combined. At a modest 2%, the amount would surpass an astronomical trillion dollars. At that point, the war could have been concluded within several months, becoming nothing more than a grim recollection.

Simultaneously, these funds could have been invested in developing its domestic military sector, thus achieving two objectives simultaneously: primarily, it would repel Russian threats via Ukrainian hands, while preparing for the chaotic world we currently inhabit.

This leads us to the European Union’s key inherent characteristic: while states terrified by Russian imperialism would likely enthusiastically support such a plan, geographic distance correlates inversely with enthusiasm. “Why should we expend billions on a threat 2,000 kilometers away?” Portuguese or Spanish citizens might justifiably inquire.

By 2025, the Union had not achieved an internal trust level sufficient to treat all member state interests equitably. Regrettably, the largest Union states bear responsibility, having treated the project as a tool for national interest realization while gradually degenerating the project’s fundamental idea. Union states closest to Russia would be irrational to depend on any entity that has failed so repeatedly in security matters.

Intermarium 2.0: The Baltic-Carpathian Alliance

Therefore, as previously mentioned, we propose the “Coalition of the Willing” concept—states sharing a specific interest and demonstrating significant determination in its realization. Multiple such coalitions might exist, but now is the time to contemplate one specific collective: the Cold Alliance, the Baltic-Carpathian Alliance, Intermarium 2.0, the Northern League—choose the name that resonates.

Unquestionably, with the collapse of the last branch sustaining the mythical European world, the complementary journey ends, and real consequences must be confronted. In the worst scenario—continued apathy—this means war on European Union’s territory. Naturally, Portuguese or Spanish citizens can remain calm, as they are not first in line; however, Romanians, Poles, Swedes, Finns, and especially the Baltic states certainly not.

Observing wavering Americans and the Union, the matter is of such importance that it cannot be left to chance. Thus, the Baltic-Carpathian Alliance must be immediately established. Its objective would be straightforward: preventing potential war outbreak within its member states and the associated loss of sovereignty.

Potential Members

Who would include this modern-day Intermarium? The states most threatened by Russian imperialism here and now, for only they will demonstrate the requisite engagement and sacrifice:

1. Poland - The cornerstone of the alliance, possessing the largest land forces among its participants and rapidly developing its naval and air capabilities.
2. Romania - The second largest entity, with significant potential and an increasingly credible military.
3. Sweden - Already engaged via the Tystberg Process, with Sweden and Finland intensely cooperating with Poland despite historical distance.
4. Finland - With its lengthy border with Russia, Finland is deeply interested in deterring potential complications, especially in a situation of an attack on the sparsely populated Finland.

The pact would also serve Norwegian interests, as they border Russia in the Arctic Circle and compete with them in the Arctic region.

Adhering strictly to the realist school of thought, the pact should ostensibly bypass the Baltic states due to their dramatically limited combat capabilities and the extremely challenging defensibility of their territory. In other words, the Baltics would constitute a liability. However, it is inconceivable to maintain that it would never be calculable under any scenario without the Baltics. In this pact, war would be virtually inevitable, with the aggressor receiving a preliminary appetizer of encouragement.

Nevertheless, the Baltic states would need to multiply their defense expenditures—a process already underway, though currently insufficient.

Naturally, other potential members exist located in the so-called second line of the attack, which would theoretically diminish their willingness to join:

• The Czech Republic - With its impressive military equipment production capabilities.
• Slovakia - Currently problematic due to its pro-Russian government, but potentially valuable provided it could be purged of Russian influences and agents.
• United Kingdom - Although London is geographically distant, it demonstrates relatively significant engagement in the Ukrainian War. Historically, the British have been consistently active in suppressing Russian imperialism in the maritime domain.
• Ukraine - A critical element we shall examine more comprehensively in a moment.

Military Potential

The core of the Baltic-Carpathian Alliance in the land domain would primarily comprise close to 400,000 troops, with the most significant contribution from Poland and Romania. If we include approximately 600,000 troops in Ukraine, the total engaged personnel would exceed 1 million. Therefore, expanding conventional potential would undoubtedly be a necessity.

Technologically, the group is beginning to acquire arguably the most valuable air asset—the F-35 fighter jet. Norway, Poland, Romania, and Finland are or will be its users. They are set to collectively possess nearly 200 such machines. Additionally, over 100 Swedish Gripen and 80 F-16s complement this arsenal. Land forces would be based on Leopard 2, Abrams, and K2 tanks.

Economic Potential

Russia reports a GDP of approximately $2.1 trillion (though this is significantly influenced by the low ruble exchange rate). Nominally, the pact states would possess a GDP of $2.7 trillion US—approximately 30% higher than Russia’s $2.1 trillion. Naturally, engaging Denmark, the Czech Republic, or especially the British would proportionately increase the collective’s potential, though realistically their membership, particularly in the initial stage, would be unlikely.

Core Principles

The critical question remains: what would the establishment of such a pact entail?

1. Mutual Defense Commitment - Alliance members would jointly declare that if any state is attacked, others would immediately engage without waiting for NATO or EU processes. The mutual defense mechanism would function on a bilateral basis, with every state most threatened by potential attack investing no less than 3% of its GDP in defense capabilities, while others would be prohibited from investing less than 2.5%. This would constitute a true defense union.

2. Military-Industrial Cooperation - Every member country would declare that army modernization would be prioritized through the group’s industrial participants, simultaneously providing an economic development stimulus for all collective members. Every crown, zloty, or leu should remain within the pact. A joint research and development center would be established, from which the entire collective would benefit.

3. Integrated Infrastructure - Advanced logistics and mutual support in the event of a conflict, creation of a shared strategic infrastructure, logistical hubs, and a common strategic reserve storage system.

4. Technological Advancement - Collaboration in space industry and satellite technologies to enhance the alliance’s intelligence and communication capabilities, as well as development of offensive capabilities, including ballistic missiles.

Security Implications

The alliance, especially the Baltic states and Finland, would be in close proximity to two of the Russian Federation’s most important cities—St. Petersburg and Kaliningrad.

If Russians enter Estonia’s Narva, everyone will look to the Americans. The problem is that if the Americans do not intervene, the entire Alliance collapses, entering an unpredictable escalation model. Washington apparently signals that this provision cannot be treated as ironclad.

Conversely, if the Baltic-Carpathian Alliance states were doubly secure by Article 5, strategic ambiguity in the Kremlin would be reinforced. Moreover, the pact would support NATO’s foundational principles if deemed necessary by Americans, because we are all deeply entrenched in this quagmire.

Ukraine’s Role

Against this backdrop, Ukraine and its potential status in the alliance become critically important. Kyiv’s potential development paths are multiple:

Firstly, it is clear that the alliance does not wish to enter a state of war with Russia; therefore, immediate incorporation of Kyiv into the collective is impossible. On the other hand, Ukraine as an entity possessing significant combat capabilities, aligned interests with the collective, and already battling the entire Russian federation could be officially or covertly supported.

The alliance would adopt a clear position: while immediate membership is impossible, if peace is achieved with territorial integrity safeguarded, Ukraine could join under preferential conditions, potentially financed through Ukrainian natural resources.

Should peace negotiations protract and Ukraine declare continued readiness and motivation to fight, the alliance should consider allocating substantial resources to re-equipping Ukraine with available technologies and assets. This could similarly be funded through Ukrainian natural resource extraction.

There is no easier method for Intermarium 2.0 states to achieve their objective than neutralizing Russian capabilities, which would be most effectively realized through Ukrainian hands rather than direct engagement.

This objective fundamentally differs from the American one, which can evidently shift significantly, and Brussels’ internally fractured approach. Consequently, this group would have far fewer reservations about scenarios involving Vladimir Putin’s removal from power.

The Baltic-Carpathian Alliance’s objective would be defending its own independence, currently threatened by the Kremlin’s imperialistic policy. Therefore, if supporting Ukraine precipitated the Kremlin’s collapse, such an outcome would be welcomed.

International Context

Theoretically, this solution should appeal to Americans, as the alliance fulfills their objective of greater European engagement. A potential discord exists—the alliance would prefer the war to continue if Ukrainians desire it, while Americans seek peace at any cost. Nonetheless, Americans would likely provide the group a nuclear umbrella because: a) They remain interested in preventing atomic warfare b) They are not eager for proliferation c) As group ties tighten, the nuclear program adds strategic ambiguity regarding whether Americans or collective states would decide on weapons of mass destruction deployment, thus negatively impacting Kremlin calculations.

Conclusion

One must note an additional aspect: the Baltic-Carpathian Alliance would originate from a single primary assumption—the desire to protect collective independence against aggressive Russian imperialism. With collective engagement and coordination, the members’ cumulative potential could create a scenario where any offensive Moscow contemplates would be deterred.

Traditional European integration attempts to consider member states’ interests relatively equally, but naturally, larger entities gravitationally attract most resources. To justify the German perspective, they might ask: “If we are the largest and possess the most substantial economy, why should we dilute our interests by considering the needs of a state five or 20 times smaller than ourselves?” In other words, potential dichotomy drives interest divergence.

In Intermarium 2.0, one can observe a healthy balance. Firstly, the group is unified by a critical common interest—effectively erecting barriers against Russian imperialism in the East. Nevertheless, it was always a block positioned between Russia and Germany, extending from the Baltic to the Black Sea and optionally the Adriatic.

Today, however, incorporating states and regions like Hungary, Slovakia, or the Balkans would be counterproductive; cooperation continues within formats like Bucharest 9, and that suffices. Conversely, the concept has historically overlooked Scandinavia.

The original Intermarium idea had the inherent problem of Polish dominance over others in every considerable aspect. In Intermarium 2.0, Poland’s potential, while still the largest, would be readily balanced by Swedish, Norwegian, or Romanian capabilities. In other words, we obtain a block of states with relatively comparable potential and converging primary security interests.

Therefore, there is minimal probability of the situation constantly observed in the European Union where German or French agency allows them to force agendas inconsistent with the rest’s objectives.

Ukraine, if it emerges successful from the ongoing war, should aspire to become an inherent alliance member. With the potential fall of Lukashenko’s regime, Belarus should similarly be considered a potential participant. However, both scenarios remain a future melody.

Naturally, this does not imply the Baltic-Carpathian Alliance should reject key formats like NATO or the EU—quite the contrary. The objective is to take matters into their own hands and not rely on or await others, especially given the group’s requisite potential to confront Russia competently.

However, if the alliance proves particularly fruitful and effective, it could potentially undermine the EU’s concept as Europe’s preferred paradigm. Conversely, the alliance should not replace any initiatives proposed by other states, particularly France or Germany. Furthermore, it should remain open to cooperation with additional partners.

It is not a comprehensive solution to Europe’s challenges, but precisely and solely a safeguard against potential Russian Federation attacks on its members.

And so, the current challenge is singular: the Russian Federation intends to test NATO’s Article 5, in which states most threatened can either passively observe these processes and hide behind NATO, which is 100% dependent on Americans and therefore unstable, or alternatively, they can take matters into their own hands, ensuring their nation’s security and future without waiting for others.

Acting individually exposes them to significant risk, whereas a large, strong group of motivated states can sufficiently deter Russia. The trust built on this foundation could constitute a framework for something more substantial than a defensive alliance in the future.

At the time of writing, the potential economically capable members of this hypothetical alliance are already signaling readiness for greater cooperation. However, its scope should significantly expand and create foundations for something much more comprehensive.

The geopolitical slumber has long since concluded. The world of the second half of the 21st century demands mature and bold decisions, one of which should be the establishment of Intermarium 2.0.